The Epistemic Problem with Metaphysical Materialism

It is my intent to defend the contention that metaphysical materialism is false, on the grounds that it necessitates an implicitly self-refuting epistemological framework. This reductio ad absurdum is predicated on the inability of any metaphysically material concrete substance to express powers other than those which are derived strictly as a deterministic reaction to external stimuli capable only of actualizing passive potencies physical in nature. Since mental affairs, including abstract reasoning, propositional knowledge, and beliefs, all possess properties distinct from physical states (e.g. lacking a physical locality, and lack of subjection to physical laws), they cannot be a consequent of an act which can only actualize potencies physical in nature. Additionally, since an agent cannot cause that which it lacks formally or eminently, metaphysical materialism precludes concrete substances possessing non-physical active potencies. As such, materialism precludes all possible states of mental affairs which give rise to abstract reasoning, propositional knowledge, or beliefs, which cannot be true, for to accept this conclusion is to refute it, and to even contemplate its plausibility proves it to be false.

Materialism holds that all constituents of the universe, including the human brain, are in all manner of existence mereologically reducible to fundamental physical particles and energy. This means that all instances of change produced by, or instantiated in, constituents of the universe are actualized strictly as a result of the causal relationship between fundamental particles and energy transfer guided by impersonal forces of physics.

If impersonal physical laws governing matter and energy are the sole source for which all instances of change in substances originate, then all states of the human brain are deterministically actualized by antecedent members in a series of physical reactions. Physical substances and structures, blindly coerced into deterministically necessary states, do not have within them, either formally or eminently, properties of abstract objects, non-physical concrete substances, or mental states.

This is not to say that materialism fails to account for the existence of any non-physical category of ontology, for the existence of any physical concrete substance or spatial dimension necessarily entails the existence of properties, relations, attributes, sets, and numbers. The argument thus only aspires to demonstrate metaphysical materialism’s inability to produce abstract objects (if such things exist), non-physical concrete substances, or mental states.

If materialism cannot account for the existence of mental states, then all humans would lack the ability to facilitate propositional knowledge, feelings, intentionality, beliefs, or abstract reasoning. However, this conclusion is self-contradictory as it in itself is a belief and an instance of propositional knowledge, arrived at by means of abstract reasoning; therefore, the assumption from which it was derived must be rejected, falsifying metaphysical materialism.

One may object to this argument by suggesting it is committing the composition fallacy, for if my argument was that because the concrete substances in materialism are composed entirely of physical particles, and physical particles do not have mental states or non-physical components, then the concrete substances in materialism do not have mental states or non-physical components, such an argument would be akin to fallacious arguments such as the following; all bricks in a building weigh less than five pounds, therefore the whole building weighs less than five pounds. However, this is dissimilar to the argument I have put forth in herein, in that my argument suggests substances which are both limited to actualizing spaciotemporal passive potencies and failing to possess any non-spaciotemporal active potencies on their own, will only ever actualize spaciotemporal potencies, no matter how numerous or complex the arrangement of substances becomes. In other words, my argument is more akin to saying that if every brick in a wall can only ever express red, then no matter how large or complex the wall is built, it will always be red, assuming the red bricks are the only material used in construction.